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Historical Overview 
Attempts by the South African state to incorporate elements of what later became 
l 
l known as the Coloured group are not new. (1) They have their origins in the attempts 
I 
by the early colonial state to deflect opposition based on a mass resistance by the 
colonized people. Stanley Trapido, in his analysis of this process of political 
I incorporation of elements of the Coloured group, has noted that: 
The need to incorporate Coloured groups had resulted 
from their long and bloody resistance ... As the Cape 
Attorney General said in a celebrated remark: '1 would 
rather meet the Hottentot at the hustings voting for 
his representative than meet the Hottentot in the 
wilds with a gun on his shoulder.* If these people 
have much physical force - are armed, and - as you 
say, disaffected - is it not better to disarm them by 
letting them participate in the privileges of the 
constitution than by refusing them those long expected 
privileges to drive them into laagers.1" (2) 
[*S. Trapido, "The Friends of the Natives" in S. Marks 
and A. A-tmore (eds), Econolsv and Society in Pre- 
Industrial South Africa (London: Longman, 1980), p. 262. 
1 For a century, althow at times with questionable conviction, this 
incorporationist, anti-integrationist strategy was adopted by successive ! adminisfrakions. Macmillan, writing in 1927 and reflecting on these tactics, noted 
I that: 
As a political experiment the constitution of 1853 has 
been abundantly justified . .. But, the very success of 
this experiment was won at the price of economic well 
being. The Coloured people have remained a community 
of poor and backward dependants. (3) 
The partial alliance had served to fragment a popular response to the ruling class 
by these dispossessed people whilst at the same time ensuring the continued 
immiseration and proletarianization of the oppressed Coloured people. 
The particular form of colour discrimination which existed prior to the 
victory of the National'Party in the 1948 election provided the basis for another 
form of incorporation of the Coloured middle-class. Findlay in 1936 estimated that 
approximately 38 per cent of the people classified as White in the Cape Province 
were of mixed descent. (4) Althou& obviously limited by the lightness of the 
individual's skin pigmentation, it was relatively easy in tpe pre-Nationalist period 
to "pass for white1' and hence become fully incorporated into the dominant race group. 
The ability to "pass for white1' depended largely on the class position of the 
individuds concerned, and this had the effect of incorporating aspirant petty- 
bourgeois and bourgeois Coloureds with a light complexion into the ruling class. (5) 
In many respects, Coloured people came to constitute the South African working class 
and, to a lesser extent, the petty bourgeoisie who, although not classified as l 
African, had failed to "pass for white1'. The class nature of colour discrimination 
in the pre-Nationalist period is exemplified by the Carnegie Commissioners. The 
Commissioners, unable to distinguish between many poor-Whites and Coloureds, l 
resolved to classify those respondents who addressed them as Baas (Master) as l I 
Coloureds. (6) I 
Coloured political organizations, which began to emerge at the turn of the I 
century, were from the outset ambivalent towards a distinct identity for the 
Coloureds. This reflects, in part, the contradictory political and ideological 
positions of these organizations and the class alliances which they embraced. For 
many working-class people, Coloured identity provided a possible source of strength 
and dignity with which to face the racist practices of White unionists and the 
decline in their living standads brought about by the post-Anglo-Boer War 
depression. For the aspirant petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie excluded from 
participation in the state, the"Colouredisttl organizations provided a potential lever 
through which to develop their power and patronage whilst at the same time 
negotiating for further rights. The African Peoplesq Organisation (APO) was the 
most significant Coloured organization. Despite the broader promise of its name, 
the APO in 1906 criticized Lord Milner for allowing Coloureds to be treated "like 
the barbarous native". (7) At the same time, Coloured leaders, and notably 
Abdurahman, the President of the A90 from 1905 until his death in 1940, repeatedly l 
attempted to use the threat of an alliance between Coloureds and Africans as a trump l l 
card in negotiations with the administration. So, for example, in 1912 Abdur- 
warned that: 
If Europeans persist in their policy of repression 
there will one day arise a solid mass of Black and 
Coloured humanity whose demands will be irresistible. (8) 
The coming to power of the Pact Government in 1924 had a critical impact on 
I the future identity of the Coloureds. Hertzog's declared policy was that: 
"Economicall , industrially and politically the Coloured man must be incorporated 
with us." (97 Strategic, as well as ideological, reasons dictated this policy, for, 
he argued: 
It would be very foolish to drive the Coloured people 
to the enemies of the Europeans - and that will happen 
if we expel him - to allow him eventually to come to 
rest in the a.rms of the native. (10) 
In order to achieve his aims, Hertzog published a comprehensive segregation 
programme in which he proposed,on the one hand, to enfranchise Coloured men and 
graduaJ.1~ to incorporate them into the ruling political structure, whilst at the same 
time totally disenfranchising and segregating Africans. (11) 
The overwhelming majority of Coloureds refused to support the segregationist I 
programme and Abduraman, despite some ambiguity, declared: ''1 do not want to sell 
the Natives1 rights or to be bribed by the Government to leave the Native in the l 
lurch." (12) African leaders, such as James Ngojo, the President of the Cape 
African National Congress (ANC) , warned that the aim of the bills was "to divide the 
people in order to rule1'. The aim of Rertzog, Ngojo insisted, was "first to 
disenfranchise the native and after that the Coloured man". (13) Opposition to the 
state's divisive policies was strong and led to an attempt to form a united front, 
culminating in the First Non-European Conference, held in June 1927 and chaired by 
Abdurahman and Sol Plaatjie. At this conference it was resolved to find ways and 
means of uniting Africans and Coloureds in their opposition to the regime, a task 
which was to occupy much of the energies of Coloured and African leaders until the 
1950s. 
The institutionalized form of political preference for people who came 
to be designated as Coloureds was given expression on the economic level by colour- 
bar and other regulations which dlowed Coloureds to enter occupations barred to 
Africans. Many crafts and skilled occupations were regulated by closed-shop and 
apprenticeship controls which served to entrench the position of relative privilege 
of Coloureds but served equally to prevent Coloureds competing with Whites for 
skilled jobs. The legislation served to reproduce, for Coloureds, an intermediate 
position in employment between Africans and Whites. 
At the same time, the employment, accommodation and movement of Aflricans, 
from the beginning of this century, was increasingly strictly regulated. Through 
these measures the ruling class was able to impose a hierarchical, racial division 
of employment and accommodation in which Africans were relegated to the lowest 
levels. Prom 1924 on, in line with the wishes of the Cape Town city councillors, 
Hertzog began to implement stricter controls over Africans. (14) In terms of the 
Hertzog strategy of Coloured labour preference, the authorities in the Transkei were 
instructed not to issue passes to Africans wishing to travel to Cape Town to seek 
work. (15) By the end of the decade the Urban Areas Act (1930) enabled the 
administration and the City Council of Cape Town to regulate the influx of Africans 
into the Cape Peninsula. By 1941, the first period for which I have reliable 
statistics, over 2300 Africans were refused entry into the Cape Peninsula, despite 
the relatively tight labour market created by the war economy. (16) 
In the Western Cape, strict influx control during the 1920s mav be 
associated with Hertzog's political strategy for Blacks - his attempt to 
incorporate Coloureds whilst segregating Africans. In part, this strategy was a 
defence against the threat of a militant black challenge. The Industrial and 
Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), in the early phase of its development, incorporated 
African and Coloured workers in an organization which potentially posed a severe 
challenge to the state. Its rapid development to its zenith in 1927-28 was 
witnessed with alarm by the state,and the incorporationist strategy of Hertzog in 
part signifies an attempt by the state to deflect oppposition based on a mushrooming 
movement incorporating African and Coloured workers. On the political level, it 
will be recalled, the Coloured leaders continued to use the possibility of an 
alliance w i t h  Africans as a lever with which to extract concessions for Coloureds 
from the state. The significance of the Coloured vote in several Cape constituencies 
was a further factor which encouraged the various political pmties to appeasl to 
promote Coloured interests. Parliamentary candidates promised concessions to the 
Coloured voters in return for their vote. (support of the majority of Coloured 
Goters for opposition candidates, particularly after 1948, and the implementation of 
political apartheid finally led to the removal of Coloured representation in 
parliament in 1968. ) 
Marion Lacey attributes the origins of the Coloured Labour Preference 
policy and strict influx control in the Western Cape, in the mid-1920s, to the 
demands of the mines for a monopoly over labour from the Eastern Cape. (17) But, 
the question of mine labour had been a major issue in the Ca~e before 1920 and cannot 
account for the brpadth or timing of Hertzog's political strategy for blacks - 
his attempt to incorporate Coloureds. The factors outlined above, which emphasize 
the challenge posed by the subordinate classes, cannot be omitted from an analysis of 
state strategy. It is these challenges which compel the state to attempt to 
reconstitute social relations in its favour and to attempt to reconstitute thensystem 
of fortresses and out work^'^ that provides the long-term guarantee of stability for 
the ruling class. 
The National Party 
The Nationalist Government, which came to  power i n  1948, developed fu l ly  the 
connnitment of previous regimes to  a "civilised labour policy1' i n  which, f i r s t l y ,  
Whites and, secondly, Coloureds would have preference i n  employment. The policy had 
i ts  effect  f i r s t  within the administration: within a year of the i r  coming t o  power they 
had replaced 1,696 Africans by 1,290 Whites and 406 Coloureds. (18) The Nationalists, 
i n  l ine  with thei r  apartheid doctrines, immediately s e t  about developing machinery 
fo r  further control over African employment, residence and movement, building on the 
foundations l a id  by previous administrations. Government Notice 1032 of 1949 
prevented African work-seekers from remaining i n  the Peninsula fo r  more than 
fourteen dqys a year. The controls were further extended i n  1952; i n  terms of 
section 27 of the Native Laws Amendment Act, all  African women i n  the Peninsula were 
subject to compulsory registration. The employment of African women i n  the Peninsula 
w a s  increasingly predicated on the possession of a valid permit - a scheme l a t e r  
inst i tuted throughout South Africa i n  order to  ensure that  "women and a l l  unemployed 
appendages" be banished to  the bantustans and that  the reproduction of the labour 
force take place i n  the African reserves. By 1956 5000 African women had been 
endorsed out of the Peninsula and 26,213 had been issued with permits to remain i n  
the area, of which 10,300 were conditional upon thei r  continued employment i n  the 
Peninsula. (19) 
The particularly s t r i c t  implementation i n  the Cape Peninsula of influx 
control regulations, together with the implementation of the Population Registration 
Act (1950)~ Group Areas Act (1950), and other legislation, i n  p a t  m a y  be understood 
i n  terms of the policy of Coloured Labour Preference adopted by the Nationalist 
regime. 
The policy w a s  f i r s t  outlined i n  some depth i n  1955. Eiselen, the 
Secretary of Native Affairs and f i r s t  lieutenant of Verwoerd, explained the policy 
i n  the following terms: 
Briefly and concisely put, our Native policy 
regarding the Western Province aims at the ultimate 
elimination of Natives from this region. (20) 
The existing mechanisms fo r  the implementation of this policy already existed and 
the policy was implemented with immediate effect. By 1957, Chief Magistrates i n  the 
Peninsula reported a decline i n  the African population of the Peninsula over the 
previous two years. Women, as I have noted, i n i t i a l l y  bore the brunt of these 
restr ict ions,  to  which they responded with valiant but ultimately unsuccessful 
defiance. By 1959 the administration had begun to  turn its attention towards men, 
and between January 1959 and March 1962 over 18,000 men and 5,975 women were 
endorsed out of the Cape Peninsula. (21) Included i n  this number were many 
individuals deported out of the region under section 29 of the Urban Areas Act - the 
"idle and undesirable1' clause. This clause w a s  widely interpreted to  include 
militant unionists, comurunity leaders and other "trouble-makers1'. Many of the ANC 
militants, such as Makholisa, the leader of the Cape Town defiance campaign, were 
expelled to  the Transkei. 
It should not here be necessary to chronicle the effects of influx 
control i n  terms of human l i f e  and suffering. People banished to  the reserves have 
faced starvation and forced separation from family and friends. It i s  not surprising 
that  the accelerating underdevelopment of the reserves and the associated relocation 
of over 1.3 million people i n  these areas have lea  to  a growth i n  the number of people 
i l l ega l ly  i n  urban areas which s ta te  repression and increased influx control have 
fai led to  reverse. (22) Official estimates place the number of i l l ega l s  l iv ing i n  
Cape Town a t  over 85,500. (23) The number working i l l ega l ly  off ic ia l ly  estimated a t  
60,000, exceeds the legally employed African population. (24j This is  despite the 
increasingly brutal enforcement of influx control measures which, fo r  example, led 
to  the conviction of 17,000 Africans i n  the Cape Peninsula i n  1978 and the deportation 
of 3,666 Africans from the area i n  August and September of 1981. (25) 
. . 
The policy of influx control i n  the Western Cape has remained vir tual ly  
unchanged since the implementation of the Black Labour Act i n  1964 and the Physical 
Planning Act i n  1968. Whereas i n  the r e s t  of the country the Riekert proposals have 
led to  major modifications i n  influx control, th is  has not occurred i n  the Western 
Cape. (26) In  th i s  region, the policies advocated by the Riekert Commissioners have 
been enforced for  nearly two decades i n  terms of the Coloured Labour Preference 
policy. So, fo r  example, the close association between accommodation and employment 
and a s t r i c t l y  regulated distinction between contract and permanent labour and the 
harsh treatment of i l legals ,  all central to  the Riekert Commission, are measures 
which have been enforced i n  the Western Cape fo r  twenty years. 
The Coloured Labour Preference policy, as I have outlined, has i t s  origins 
i n  the attempt by the ruling class to  deflect the challenge of a mass opposition 
against the state. I n  the l92Os,and again i n  the 1950s and 19708, t h i s  was 
particularly evident. A s  the Minister of Finance at the time of the Shaxpeville 
and Langa uprisings i n  1960 and the subsequent declaration of a s t a t e  of emergency 
noted: 
The disturbances have taught us another lesson to  
which the Government has also directed attention 
previously. T h i s  lesson is that  i n  those areas 
where the Coloured community forms the natural 
source of labour, i t  i s  wrong to  import Bantu i n  
large numbers, and eventually to  create two 
unprosperous c o d t i e s  - the Government w i l l ,  
therefore, apply more s t r i c t l y  i t s  policy that  
Coloured labour should be put to  the best possible 
use . . . (27) 
On the one hand, the s ta te  sought to legis la te  against the employment and residence 
of Africans i n  the Western Cape. A t  the same time the s ta te  sought to increase the 
insecurity of the remaining contract workers i n  the Western Cape, part ly i n  order, 
it  was hoped, to reduce the i r  militancy. The success of this strategy to this day 
remains a subject of heated debate within the s ta te ,  employer class, and trade 
unions. It i s  clear, however, that  no simple correspondence exis ts  between the 
threat of deportation and militancy. Evidence given to the Commission of Inquiry 
in to  the attempted insurrection at Paarl i n  1962 suggests that  the increased threats 
and insecurity faced by the migrant workers was a direct  cause of the surge i n  
militant ac t iv i ty  among the Paarl workers, whilst that  given to  the Ci l l i6  Commission, 
investigating the 1976 uprisings, suggests the opposite i s  the case. (28) My research 
project, covering over four hundred workers, trade unionists and employers i n  the 
Western Cape during 1981, revealed that  migrant workers cannot be assumed to  be l ess  
militant. Nor do they conform to  the stereotypes of economism and ethnicity which 
at times are ascribed to  th i s  group by the authorities and others. The specific 
historical  experience of many migrant workers i n  the Western Cape i n  the 1950s was 
one of radical militancy. T h i s  experience served to  bind migrant and permanently 
se t t led  workers i n  thei r  united opposition to the regime. The consciousness and 
actions of workers and communities cannot be determined a pr ior i  i n  terms of 
structural determinants. Rather, i t  i s  necessary to  examine the i r  specific 
h is tor ical  experience. I n  the Western Cape the nature of trade unionism, pol i t ica l  
leadership and organization, religion and other factors i s  c r i t i c a l  i n  this respect. 
Employers, although opposing the s t r i c t  enforcement of the Coloured Labour Preference 
policy, have un t i l  recently broadly supported i ts  objectives. Their main concern has 
been the loss of a "pool of labourf1 and with the effects of a policy of influx 
control which is  not uniformly applied throughout South Africa - fearing that  this 
may ra ise  wages i n  the Cape and undermine the competitiveness of Cape industry. (29) 
Of course, important contradictions exist  within the capi ta l is t  class. Capitalist 
famers,  manufacturers and others who are unable to relocate elsewhere and are i n  
need of an abundant supply of cheap, unskilled labour have been particularly vocal 
i n  thei r  criticism of the Coloured Labour Preference policy, w h i l s t  large finance 
capital ists ,  many of whom are not dependent on cheap African labour and who are 
able to operate i n  different regions, have emphasized the long-run strategic 
advantages of the Coloured Labour Preference policy. 
The concern of Cape business, naturally enough, has been that  
prof i tabi l i ty  should not be adversely affected by the particularly s t r i c t  
enforcement of influx control i n  the Western Cape. I n  particular, the Cape Chamber 
of Industries i n  1960 insisted that ,  whilst "we accept the fact  that  Native influx 
control i s  necessary", llColoureds were not interested i n  or  suitable for  performing 
unskilled work and we must therefore emphasise the need for  a local  Native labour 
pool". (30) Many employers, over a long period of time, have come t o  accept and 
reproduce an ideology which identif ies the Coloured proletariat  as "work-shy" and 
l l i d l e t l  , prone to  "absenteeism", "drunkenness1' and "inebrietyq1. (31) In  part,  this 
ideology is  rooted i n  an appreciation of the destitution and family decw which 
have accompanied the destruction of c o d t i e s  and the oppression of the Coloureds. 
Whereas "idle and undesirable" Africans are endorsed out of the urban areas, 
Coloured vagrants and unemployed remain i n  f'ull view of the bourgeoisie, But, the 
reluctance of employers to  employ Coloureds i n  unslsilled tasks also ref lects  the 
successful resistance of Coloureds to  low wages and management's ab i l i ty  to 
capitalize on the extreme poverty, desperation and insecurity of i l l ega l  and migrant 
Africans. Furthermore, the representatives of Cape employers see the preferential 
treatment of Coloureds i n  education, housing and employment as a cause of the 
resistance of Coloureds to  super-exploitation. The Cape Chamber of Industries has 
told the Government that, whilst i t  broadly supported the objectives of the policy 
of Coloured Labour Preference, "there must be a w d n g  and a plea not to s e t  the 
sights too high ... which w i l l  engender i n  many Coloureds the feeling that  
labouring work i s  beneath them". (32) 
The solution recently offered by Cape employers i s  to  ensure an adequate 
supply of labour by providing urban blacks with permanent ri&ts to remain i n  the 
area. This they jus t i fy  on strategic grounds, i n  l ine  with the ideology of to ta l  
strategy currently popular with the ruling class. I n  the i r  evidence to  the Wiehahn 
Commission, the Cape Chamber of Industry warned of urban blacks being 
... intensely frustrated by the limitations imposed 
by the i r  employment. Dissatisfaction on that  account 
i s  already reaching disturbing proportions and i s  
bound to erupt i f  t h i s  relat ively s m a l l  segment of 
our Western Cape population i s  not provided with more 
satisfactory job opportunities. (33) 
In  part,  the pleas of Cape industry to  the authorities have been answered. The s ta te ,  
i n  conjunction with the Urban Foundation and a consortium of monopoly capital ists ,  
has begun t o  provide bet ter  quality permanent housing and employment opportunities 
fo r  aspirant permanently se t t led  Africans i n  the Peninsula. 
The R u l i n g  Party 
Up to  this point, I have presented the National Party's strategy of Coloured Labour 
Preference as coherent and unproblematical. This i s  a gross over-simplification. 
A s  OlMeara has argued i n  a recent paper: 
The National Party came into office i n  1948 as  the 
pol i t ica l  organisation of a shifting, highly 
differentiated and contradictory class alliance. (34) 
OIMeara identifies important differences between the social basis, organization, 
membership and ideology of the Cape and Transvaal provincial organizations which are 
relatively autonomous within the partyls federal structure. The Transvaal party i s  
broadly identified with the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie and White workers, whilst the 
Cape party has always been dominated by big Afrikaner capital and capitalist farmers. 
The doctrinaire policies of the Verwoerd era, and with these I would include the 
Coloured Labour Preference Policy developed by SABRA, are closely associated with 
the ascendancy of the Transvaal party in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Coloured question, it seems, has consistently provided an important 
source of friction within the Nationalist Party. It was a source of division between 
Malan and Hertzog, which contributed to the 1934 split and emergence of the National 
Party, with Malan, a founder of the National Party, recommending the removal of 
Coloureds from the voters' roll in opposition to Hertzog's incorporationist policy. 
It should be noted that, in the pre-war period at least, the regional divisions 
hypothesized by OtMeara and others fail to provide an adequate account of the 
complexity of the alliances which directed Nationalist policies. The base of Malan 
was in the Cape whilst that of Hertzog was in the Orange Free State and Transvaal 
interior. Malanls strategy provided the foundation for doctrinaire policy of 
apartheid developed under the leadership of Verwoerd. 
The rise of Verwoerd can be associated with the increased regional 
bi-cation of the National Party. The Transvaal party, from that time until the 
current crisis, has consistently adopted a strategy which favours the complete 
segregation of the Coloureds. Verwoerd viewed the Coloureds as a I1nation in their 
own right1' and in 1959 insisted that: 
... we definitely do not accept that there will be 
integration or intermingling of the political 
structure for the Coloured and for the white man, 
neither in the municipal sphere nor in any higher 
sphere. (35) 
Verwoerd and his allies in SABRA and the Department of Native Affairs supported the 
notion of Coloured self-government within the White state of the Western Cape. The 
proposed removal of all Africans from the Western Cape,announced in 1955,was in line 
with this aim. So too was the removal of Coloured representation from parliament 
and the passage of legislation which created a separate Coloured Persons? 
Representative Council. The fundamentalist position adopted by Verwoerd, on the 
issue of Coloured identity, has been strongly upheld by subsequent leaders of the 
Transvaal Party. It is no accident that Connie Mulder and Andries Treurnicht, the 
principal protagonists of Verwoerdts separatist doctrines, have now left the party 
to form a conservative opposition. Prominent in the manifesto of these parties is 
the segregation of Coloureds and the rejection of P. W. Botha's scheme of powe+ 
sharing for Coloureds and Indians. 
P. W. Botha, O'Meara argues, represents the interests of the Cape 
Nationalist Party and Afrikaner monopoly capital. Botha, as Prime Minister of an 
increasingly centralized and militarized state, has focussed much of his energy on 
the integration of Coloureds into the ruling political arena. In the main his 
reasons have been strategic and must be understood within the context of the Totd 
Strategy plan outlined by Botha in 1977. (36) Coloureds, Botha and his military 
advisers argue, can provide a much needed bulwark in defence of the state: 
There are thousands of coloured people who are 
Christians and anti-comunmists. I say the time 
has come to take these people as far as possible 
with us, for the sake of civilisation and the 
security of the country. (37) 
The President's Council, Botha added, had been appointed in order to perform this 
task: 
All the Government is doing is to say to the 
Coloured people, 'we cannot include you in a 
common voter's roll, because if we do there will 
be agitation to include urban blacks and soon we'll 
have black majority rule. Therefore we have to 
find other methods' ; (38) 
Despite speculation that Botha favours the restoration of a parliamentazy vote for 
Coloureds on a separate voters1 roll (39) ,  a Special National Congress of the 
federally organized National Party, only the third in its history, on Botha' S 
instigation approved plans for separate White, Coloured and Indian parliaments 
overseen by a President and Cabinet whose authority would be paramount in all 
matters of "common interest'?. The proposed constitution closely resembles that 
approved by the National Party at its 1977 Congress and has, according to one 
commentator, "estranged reformists by dashing them1'. (40) 
The strategy of the state is a further desperate attempt to win the 
support of the Coloured and Indian bourgeoisie and, if possible, extend this 
alliance to include" the bulk of the Coloured and Indian populations. The alliance 
between the military, the state and monopoly capital, although riddled with 
conflicts and contradictions has been associated with fresh attempts to reconstitute 
social relations in favour of the ruling class. The "incessant and persistent 
efforts to defend and extend the existing balance of forces" are broadly contained 
within the Total Strategy Plan. The object of this is to deflect opposition based 
on a mass populist challenge to the state. In the Western Cape the policy is 
articulated in the attempts to incorporate politically and economically elements of 
the population designated as Coloured. As Botha has insisted, "we must adapt or 
die1'. (41) 
The historical experience of the ruling class together with political 
considerations within the ruling party have determined that at least in the present 
phase this reformist, incorporationist strategy is to be directed at Coloureds and 
Indians and, to a lesser extent, urban Africans. The Strategy is directed at the 
co-option of the black leadership and incipient bourgeoisie, and no changes have 
been initiated which will alleviate the exploitation and suffering experienced by the 
broad mass of black workers, their families and dependants. On the contrary, the 
regulations and repressive provisions which govern the lives of the proletariat 
have been streamlined and rendered more effective. 
Previous attempts by the state to incorporate the Coloured bourgeoisie 
have met with limited but not negligible response. In so far as the state has 
succeeded in producing "political schizophrenia" in the Coloured leadership and 
has partially undermined an effective populist oppositional alliance, their policies 
of flirting with Coloured politicians and legislating for racist trade unions and 
other institutions have not been in vain. But, the resistance of Coloureds to 
separate Coloured political institutions has been effective. The boycott of all 
elections for separate Coloured representation by the overwhelming majority of 
persons eligible to vote and the political sabotaging of the Coloured Persons' 
Representative Council by the (coloured) Labour Party reflect the level of 
opposition to these institutions. It is this resistance which has prompted the 
government to explore new forms of political incorporation for Coloureds. 
It is not clear to what extent the antagonism directed towards separate 
institutions is rooted in the ineffectiveness of these institutions. It is the view 
of many opponents of the state, within the ruling bloc, that given an effective say 
the Coloureds would opt for an alliance with the ruling class. A rejection of 
separate institutions by the Coloured leadership cannot be assumed a priori to be 
indicative of a rejection of a separate Coloured identity or an identity of 
Coloureds with a populist challenge to the state. 
l 
The evidence suggests that within the grou~ designated by the state as 
Coloured critical divisions exist and that, whilst a minority of the group and 
notably the bourgeoisie and aspirant new middle class are committed to collaboration 
with the ruling class, the bulk of the Coloureds are firmly committed to non- 
collaboration. Discretionary collaboration, which has been the hallmark of 
Coloured organizations such as the APO and the Labour Party, has been undermined as 
a viable option by the failure of successive regimes to honour the commitments of 
the discretionary collaborationists to their constituents. It seems, therefore, 
that increasingly the Coloureds, whom a Nationalist Minister once described as 
"The allies of the whites in the struggle for South Africa1' (42), a e  now more 
estranged from the Whites and the ruling class than they have ever been. The 
Labour Pwty, although still ambivalent, declared that "we accept the word black 
because we are defining ourselves now". (43) Rejecting the recent offers of 
participation in the Presidentls Council, the leader of the Party made c1ea.r that: 
Nothing but direct representation in parliament 
for all South Africans is going to satisfy the 
majority of South Africans and particularly the 
Labour Party. (44) 
Collaboration with the regime for the Coloured bourgeoisie carry the 
incentive of a house in Constantia, a R24,000 p.a. job on the Presidentls Council, 
or simply a chance to wield economic and political power and patronage. (45) But, 
despite the promises of the Coloured Labour Preference policy, over ninety percent 
of Coloureds earn below the PDL and over thirty percent are unemployed or marginally 
employed. (46) For the bulk of the Coloured population - the proletariat, the 
students and sections of the'petty bourgeoisie - the existing system and the new 
reformism have little to offer and will continue to be rejected. 
The attempt by the state to incorporate the bulk of the individuals 
designated as Coloured and to prevent a populist black alliance is failing. 
Investigating the cause of Coloured participation in the 1976 uprisings, the 
Governmentls Connnissioners were forced to admit that the Coloureds 
were prepared to regard the Black man as his 
comrade in distress and to continue the struggle 
for improvement with him.... They reject not only 
the word 'Coloured' but also the idea of a separate 
Coloured identity.... He joined up with the Black 
community so as to remove his grievances and obtain 
his rights through concerted action. (47) 
l 
The individuals defined by the state and the ruling class as Coloured increasingly 
are rejecting this designation and, through struggle, are defining themselves. 
l 
Conclusion 
1 
1 
l I have indicated that the effect of the legal-administrative division of the African 
labour force into permanently settled, contract and illegd workers has not 
l succeeded in producing a highly fragmented African working class in the Western 
Cape. This, I suggest, is in part due to the unifying and radicalizing influence 
of progressive trade unions and political and comurunity organizations which have 
successfully embedded themselves in the daily experience of the African working 
class. Coloured workers, on the other hand, since the turn of the century, have 
been subject to highly economistic and racist trade unions. (48) These, together 
with the ambiguous attitudes and"Colouredistl' perspectives of the major Coloured 
political parties, have had a devastating impact on the Coloured working class. 
The domination of ra;dical Coloured politics by principled intellectuals who have 
failed to penetrate below the petty bourgeoisie and have engendered a politics of 
inaction has compounded the situation. The overall effect has been to produce a 
Coloured working class which does, at times, tend towards racist perceptions of the 
African working class. Although opposed to the state,these workers remain hesitant 
to identify with the African oppressed and display what Adam Small has described as 
"the political schizo hrenia of the Coloured person, a condition more common than 
the common coldf1. (497 
The "political schizophrenia" and racist perceptions which may be embedded 
in the consciousness of certain groups of Coloureds, as I have argued, is the result 
of the specific historical experience of these workers and the failure of their 
collective organizations, communities and leadership to resist these divisive 
tendencies. The distinct racial identity of Coloured workers, where it exists, 
demonstrates the success of the dominant ideology in penetrating the dominated 
classes and reproducing a distinct racial form of consciousness. But, as I have also 
argued, the identity of individuals as Coloureds cannot simply be ascribed to the 
successful penetration of a dominant ideology. Furthermore, Coloured identity, in 
so f a  as it exists, is profoundly ambiguous and may be intertwined in infinite, 
historically specific permutations with familial, cultural, religious, political, 
communal and other determinations of consciousness and action, which preclude any 
simple race or class determinism. (50) 
The extent to which individuals designated as Coloureds recognize and 
act upon this racial identity is never pre-given. This identity, particularly in 
so far as it determines political action and consciousness, is itself a site of l 
struggle. In the Western Cape, as is the case elsewhere, the working class is 
defining itself through struggle. 1 
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